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The articles below are now available on our website. All but the first one will be part of an upcoming volume devoted to payments systems.
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| Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auctioning Treasury Bills in 1929 |
| Kenneth D. Garbade |
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| The U.S. Treasury began auctioning zero-coupon bills in 1929 to complement the fixed-price subscription offerings of coupon-bearing certificates of indebtedness, notes, and bonds that it had previously relied upon. Bills soon came to play a central role in Treasury cash and debt management. This article explains that the Treasury began auctioning bills to mitigate flaws in the structure of its financing operations that had become apparent during the 1920s. The flaws included the underpricing of new issues to limit the risk of a failed offering; borrowing in advance of actual requirements, resulting in negative carry on Treasury cash balances at commercial banks; and the redemption of maturing issues in advance of tax receipts, resulting in short-term borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks that sometimes led to transient fluctuations in reserves available to the banking system and undesirable volatility in overnight interest rates. |
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| Intraday Liquidity Management: A Tale of Games Banks Play |
| Morten L. Bech |
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| Over the last few decades, most central banks, concerned about settlement risks inherent in payment netting systems, have implemented real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. Although RTGS systems can significantly reduce settlement risk, they require greater liquidity to smooth nonsynchronized payment flows. Thus, central banks typically provide intraday credit to member banks, either as collateralized credit or priced credit. Because intraday credit is costly for banks, how intraday liquidity is managed has become a competitive parameter in commercial banking and a policy concern of central banks. This article uses a game-theoretical framework to analyze the intraday liquidity management behavior of banks in an RTGS setting. The games played by banks depend on the intraday credit policy of the central bank and encompass two well-known paradigms in game theory: “the prisoner’s dilemma” and “the stag hunt.” The former strategy arises in a collateralized credit regime, where banks have an incentive to delay payments if intraday credit is expensive, an outcome that is socially inefficient. The latter strategy occurs in a priced credit regime, where postponement of payments can be socially efficient under certain circumstances. The author also discusses how several extensions of the framework affect the results, such as settlement risk, incomplete information, heterogeneity, and repeated play. |
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| Global Trends in Large-Value Payments |
| Morten L. Bech, Christine Preisig, and Kimmo Soramäki |
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| Globalization and technological innovation are two major forces affecting the financial system and its infrastructure. Perhaps nowhere are these trends more apparent than in the internationalization and automation of payments. While the effects of globalization and technological innovation are most obvious on retail payments, the influence is equally impressive on wholesale, or interbank, payments. Given the importance of payments and settlement systems to the smooth operation and resiliency of the financial system, it is important to understand the potential consequences of these developments. This article presents ten major long-range trends in the settlement of large-value payments worldwide. The trends are driven by technological innovation, structural changes in banking, and the evolution of central bank policies. The authors observe that banks, to balance risks and costs more effectively, are increasingly making large-value payments in real-time systems with advanced liquidity-management and liquidity-saving mechanisms. Moreover, banks are settling a larger number of foreign currencies directly in their home country by using offshore systems and settling a greater number of foreign exchange transactions in Continuous Linked Settlement Bank or through payment-versus-payment mechanisms in other systems. The study also shows that the service level of systems is improving, through enhancements such as longer operating hours and standardized risk management practices that adhere to common standards, while transaction fees are decreasing. Payments settled in large-value payments systems are more numerous, but on average of smaller value. Furthermore, the overall nominal total value of large-value payments is increasing, although the real value is declining. |
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| An Economic Perspective on the Enforcement of Credit Arrangements: The Case of Daylight Overdrafts in Fedwire |
| Antoine Martin and David C. Mills |
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| A fundamental concern for any lender is credit risk—the risk that a borrower will fail to fully repay a loan as expected. Thus, lenders want credit arrangements that are designed to compensate them for—and help them effectively manage—this type of risk. In certain situations, central banks engage in credit arrangements as lenders to banks, so they must manage their exposure to credit risk. This article discusses how the Federal Reserve manages its credit risk exposure associated with daylight overdrafts. The authors first present a simple economic framework for thinking about the causes of credit risk and the possible tools that lenders have to help them manage it. They then apply this framework to the Federal Reserve’s Payments System Risk policy, which specifies the use of a variety of tools to manage credit risk. The study also analyzes a possible increase in the use of collateral as a credit risk management tool, as presented in a recent proposal by the Federal Reserve concerning changes to the Payments System Risk policy. |
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