# Contagion, Cascades and Disruptions to the Interbank Payment System

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
clearing and settlement

financial markets

markets for goods and services

#### Primer on Interbank Payment System

Federal Reserve - bank of banks



Lower Manhattan September 15, 2001 Source: Space Imaging

Ver

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
100000

ERBN

#### A Break Down in Coordination


Payments Sent<sub>t</sub> =  $\alpha + \beta \cdot$  Payments Received<sub>t</sub> +  $\varepsilon_t$ 

Slope of Reaction Function of Payments Sent to Payments Received: Fixed-Effects Tobit Model




McAndrews and Potter (2002)

#### The Intraday Liquidity Management Game




Rational players are pulled in one direction by considerations of mutual benefit and in the other by considerations of personal risk


#### Adjustment following Wide-Scale Disruption



#### **Heterogeneous Banking Sector**



Share of banks hit by disruption / holding back payments




#### **Research Goals**


- Evaluate the actual network topology of interbank payment flows through analysis of Fedwire transaction data
- 2. Build a parsimonious agent based model for payment systems that honors network topology
- 3. Evaluate response of payment systems to shocks and the possibility of cascading failure

# All Commercial Banks >6600 nodes, 70,000 tinks


#### **Network Components**



### **Out-Degree Distribution**



### **Scale-free Networks**



Albert, Jeong, Barabasi, Nature 2000


Preferential attachment "*rich get richer*"


tolerant to random failure...

vulnerable to informed attack


# But, not all scale free networks are created Equal

#### LaViollete, Beyeler, Glass, Physica A, 2006 Fedwire network --- Poisson random network (p=0.30%)







# Congestive failure of the WECC




#### Number of Nodes in GSCC




# Connectivity



# Average Path Length



## 9/11




Note: 100 = September 10th, 2001.

#### A Break Down in Coordination

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Slope of Reaction Function of Payments Sent to Payments Received: Fixed-Effects Tobit Model




McAndrews and Potter (2002)


#### **Research Goals**

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# **Payment Physics Model**




# Influence of Liquidity




Summed over the network, instructions arrive at a steady rate


When liquidity is high payments are submitted promptly and banks process payments independently of each other




# Influence of Liquidity



# Influence of Liquidity



### **Influence of Market**



A liquidity market substantially reduces congestion using only a small fraction (e.g. 2%) of payment-driven flow


#### **Research Goals**

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
# Ongoing Disruption Analyses


Disruption of a bank creates a liquidity sink in the system

Simulation Period



Disruptions to liquidity market represented as decreased conductance





System throughput can be rapidly degraded

Queues build; system becomes increasingly congested; recovery quickly follows restoration

# What we're learned

- Payment system participants have learned to coordinate their activities, and this coordination can be re-established after massive disruption
- Payment flows, like many other networks, follow a scale-free distribution
- Performance is a function of both topology and behavior neither factor alone is enough to evaluate robustness
- Liquidity limits can lead to congestion and a deterioration of throughput, but a shift in behavior is evidently needed to understand responses to disruption
- System performance can be greatly improved by moving small amounts of liquidity to the places where it's needed
- Collaboration among researches with different backgrounds helps bring new theoretical perspectives to real problems, and helps shape theoretical development to practical ends

### Next steps

- Intraday analysis of network topology
  - ▲ How does it get built?
  - Over what time scales do banks manage liquidity?
  - Are there discernable behavioral modes (e.g. early/late settlement) or triggers (e.g. settlement of market transactions)?
- Long-term network dynamics (e.g. changes in TARGET topology with integration)
- Disruption/recovery behavior of simple model, including a central bank
- Adaptation of decision process, including market participation, to minimize cost (ongoing).
  - How is cooperative behavior established and maintained?
  - How might it be disrupted, restored, through institutions' policies and reactions?
- Modeling the processes that drive payment flows (banks' and customer investments, market movements, etc.) to:
  - introduce plausible correlations and other structure on the payment instruction stream
  - explore the feedbacks between payment system disruptions and the economy